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FOREWORD
THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW UNDER
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
Allen Sultan*
Historically, any U.S. foreign policy founded upon blatant violations of
international law has proven to be counterproductive and ultimately selfdefeating over the long haul.1
Probably not since the Panama Policy of Theodore Roosevelt 2 has
the commitment to the international rule of law by an American president been as severely questioned as at the present time. To Roosevelt's
credit, he was able to swiftly balance that legal maladventure with being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.$ Today's ever-rising criticism of
President Reagan, however, remains unchallenged by any similar
achievement. Thus, we are experiencing an unmuted chorus articulating an aggravated insensitivity-some would say arrogance-towards
respect for international law on the part of President Reagan and his
policy makers. The chronological "bill of particulars" that can be advanced to support this criticism is most telling. Cumulatively, these
particulars create a mosaic that belies the administration's stated commitment to a society of nations governed by the international rule of
law.

I.

HUMAN RIGHTS

After his election, but prior to his inauguration, President Reagan
sent a message to certain Latin American leaders: They could expect
* Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law. A.B., Syracuse University (1952);
J.D., Columbia University (1958); A.M., University of Chicago (1962); LL.M., New York University (1965).
I. Boyle, Chayes, Dore, Falk, Feinrider, Ferguson, Fine, Nunes, Weston, International
Lawlessness in Grenada, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 174 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Lawlessness].
2. The undisputed facts concerning Roosevelt's meddlings in Columbia in order to expedite
construction of the Panama Canal are succinctly presented in S. MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY
OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 824-26 (1965).
3. Id. at 827.
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relief from the pressures of the previous Carter administration regarding their grave violations of internationally recognized human rights.'
True to his promise, once in office, the new president swiftly embraced
a policy that relegated the protection of human rights to the status of
"just another tool in the cold war."'5 To many, it was not merely coincidence that President Reagan's first congressional defeat involved his
administration's stewardship of this vital area.6 More recently, such observers are similarly unsurprised by his three and a half year silence
over ratification of the Genocide Convention-a pact that had been
supported by all seven of his predecessors since its formulation shortly
after World War II. Democrat and Republican, liberal and conservative, from Truman to Carter, all had called for U.S. Senate approval.
Yet, the Reagan administration, after that three and a half years of
moral paralysis, suddenly exhibited a deep concern for genocide just
two months before election day, and less than three weeks before the
Senate's planned adjournment. 7 Clearly, formal "advice and consent"
was next to impossible in such a short period of time, especially when
that body was concerned with budget problems, although President
Reagan's speech writers had ample opportunity to mark the "effort."
II.

LAW OF THE SEA TREATY

Since 1973, the law of the sea has been the comprehensive subject
of the largest and longest international conference in history. 8 From
1973 until 1980, the two U.S. ambassadors to the United Nations Con-

N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1980, at Al, col. 6; id., Dec. 4, 1980, at Ad, col. 3.
Sultan, Ronald Reagan on Human Rights: The Gulag vs. The Death Squads, 10 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 339 (1985).
6. Leach, Human Rights in the Reagan Administration: Four Perspectives-A View from
the House, 31 FED. B. NEWS & J. 207 (1984). Representative Leach (R. Iowa) describes the
event in the following manner:
[A] polarization in the public debate over human rights .. .was exacerbated by the Administration's appointment of Ernest Lefever to fill the post of Assistant Secretary of State
for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.
4.
5.

Lefever's nomination drew instant criticism. Congressional skepticism of his commitment to human rights activism and inquiry into possible monetary conflicts of interest
caused the President to withdraw the nomination under a cloud of acrimony, if not scandal.
However, in a seeming fit of pique, the President's appointment people left the assistant
secretary position vacant for months until charges of indifference caused Eliott Abrams to
be designated the President's point man on human rights.
Id. at 207.
7. Election Year Stand on Genocide, TIME, Sept. 17, 1984, at 34. See also Baab, President
Endorses Genocide Pact, A.B.A. L. & NAT'L SECURITY INTELLIGENCE REP., Sept. 1984, at 1.The
unusually frantic work done by the Senate concerning the convention is detailed in Baab, Senate
Acts on Genocide Treaty, id., Oct. 1984, at 1.
8. L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 298 (1980) [hereinafter cited as L. HENKIN].
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ference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), first Jack Stevenson, and
then Elliot Richardson, were leading forces 9 in the series of accommodations that resolved innumerable conflicting interests'l-a process
similar to the compromises that led to the framing of our national Constitution." In the words of the vice-chairman of the United States delegation, "the conference endeavored to elaborate by consensus a single
comprehensive 'package deal' of disparate and complex elements." 2
Yet, in March, 1981, a mere two months after assuming power, President Reagan "suddenly and unexpectedly" 1 3 appointed a new United
States delegation,' 4 and announced a new policy-that this country
could no longer accept the draft that had been produced by UNCLOS
during the administrations of his three predecessors, both Republican
and Democrat.' 5
It appears that the newly proposed law of the sea, which contains
more than 200 pages and 446 articles, 8 and creates long-needed inno9. 1982 PROC. AM. Soc'y INT'L L. 113 (remarks by Alan Beesley). Mr. Beesley, Canadian
ambassador to the convention, described the American ambassadors' contributions to the convention as providing an honest, problem-solving approach for the United States.
This policy consisted of working side by side with other countries whether or not they
shared the U.S. position. The delegation did not alienate other delegations by simply issuing demands. The United States could easily have stonewalled the Conference at many
stages, and on many issues, yet, it did not. The United States sought to solve problems.
Id. (emphasis added).
10. On the process of group consensus and accommodation, see Oxman, The Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Tenth Session, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1982).
Professor Oxman, vice chairman of the U.S. delegation, quoted a statement by Norway's Ambassador Jens Evensen, made at the Tenth Session, and relating to this process:
We all accepted as self-evident that a conference of this magnitude and complexity would
be time-consuming. We wanted to have all states in on the final result. It is a conference
where we had to find acceptable compromises between super-powers, between East and
West, between the developing countries and the industrialized countries, between
neighbours with fundamentally opposite views in actual disputes ....
We had to proceed from issue to issue, from chapter to chapter .... In this stepwise
approach we also had to build up confidence based on the self-evident assumption that
delegations and states, although not formally bound would stand by their express or tacit
commitments. If one main state or group of states rescind one main element of the package, the whole package would fall apart and the compromise package elaborated with
such finesse, perhaps even ingenuity, over the years would collapse like a house of cards. A
lack of understanding of this main element of the gentleman's agreement accepted by all in
1973, would spell disaster for the consensus principle.
Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
II. C. ROSSITER, 1787-THE GRAND CONVENTION 202-03 (1966); A. SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 175 (1965).
12. Oxman, supra note 10, at 4.
13. N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1981, at Al, col. 1.
14. Oxman, supra note 10, at 2. "On March 7, 1981, Ambassador James L. Malone was
named Special Representative of the President for the Law of the Sea Conference, leading a new
U.S. delegation on which several officials were replaced by the new administration." Id.
15. Id.
16. See generally L. SOHN & K. GUSTAFSON, THE LAW OF THE SEA IN A NUTSHELL 172-80
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vations,1 7 does not satisfy the entrepreneurship of a few private business interests in the United States.1 8 Thus, in April of 1982, the Reagan administration frustrated eight years of diplomacy by casting a
negative vote on the treaty-a vote that had the clear effect of compounding the existing confusion regarding the law of the sea. 9 Predictably, responsible world diplomats expressed deep frustration and
anguish over (as they saw it) an inexperienced administration that was
willing to disrupt such an important new era in the international rule of
law merely to achieve a relatively small, additional, monetary gain for
a limited number of its nationals.2 0

(1984); Allott, Power Sharing in the Law of the Sea, 77 AM. J.INT'L L. 1 (1983); Oxman, The
New Law of the Sea, 69 A.B.A. J. 156 (1983).
17. Examples are new regimes for "Archipelagic waters" and international straits, and the
creation of an "exclusive economic zone." United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
opened for signature, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1261, arts. 46-75.
18. Dayton Daily News, Feb. 21, 1982, at G12, col. 1.
A proposed international Law of the Sea must give private corporations more freedom to
mine the sea floor and give the United States more say over how it is done, Reagan administration officials said Saturday.
FOR MORE THAN a decade, Republican and Democratic administrations supported
the concept of the proposed Law of the Sea, and a 180 page agreement was completed just
before President Reagan took office ....
Now the United States appears to be rejecting even the basic theory that an organization composed of most of the world's nations should administer undersea mining in international waters with all countries having an equal vote.
Id. (emphasis in original).
For the assertion that the policy change resulted from a study by the Heritage Foundation
that concluded "the treaty ran against U.S. interests," see Thunder on the Right, TIME, Dec. 3,
1984, at 23. For the official administration justification, see L. SOHN & K. GUSTAFSON, supra note
16, at 178.
19. The Reagan Crew at Sea, N.Y. Times, May 4, 1982, at 30, col. I.
A great venture came to a sour climax last week when the Reagan administration cast one
of four votes against the Law of the Sea, which American diplomacy helped initiate.
The treaty is a rare accommodation of global interests and ideologies, striking innumerable practical bargains ....
Eight years of diplomacy is thus frustrated and the Law of the Sea is left even more
confused.
Id. (emphasis added).
20. See the commentary at 1982 PROC. AM. Soc'y INT'L L. 107-20. Perhaps the best overall, neutral and balanced response came in the Tenth Session from Professor Riphagen, representing the Netherlands-the home of Hugo Grotius, "the Father of Modern International Law."
(Grotius' volume Mare Liberum or "freedom of the seas," which was first published in 1609,
established the "common heritage of mankind" concept embraced by the UNCLOS. Rooted in
natural law precepts, the United States' defense of this freedom was the direct cause of our entry
into the War of 1812 and a major factor of our involvement in World War I as well. S. MORISON,
supra note 2, at 379, 852, 857 & 859).
Responding to the underlying issue of the conference's process or procedure, an issue that had
been raised by the United States' insistence on an open-ended commitment to renegotiate at this
late date, Professor Riphagen made what could well be the conclusive response to President Reagan's policy of last minute reversal or obstructionism.
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Rather than accept this outcome, the nations of the world are proceeding without the United States.2 1 This predictable response means
that for limited pecuniary objectives, the Reagan administration sacrificed all the other provisions of the treaty it found desirable-including
the U.S. Navy's much sought after freedom of movement for military
vessels without the prior consent of coastal states.2 1 One can only con-

Doubts have been expressed in various quarters about the utility of the dialogue on
which we have recently embarked .. . . [L]et me state at the outset that I do not share
those doubts ....
. . . [W]e remain under the duty to strive for a generally acceptable regime of the seas, in
other words towards consensus.
This is not merely so because our rules of procedure so prescribe, but far more important, because the subject matter itself-the legal regime of the seas--so requires. Ever
since the idea-if not the word-that the seas are the common heritage of mankind has
come to be accepted-and we commemorate in the year after next that one of the greatest
proponents of that idea, Hugo Grotius, was born 400 years ago--the necessity of a general
regime to be complied with by all states was implied. Now that we are in the process of a
new progressive development of such a general regime, we should not lose sight of this goal.
We are not drafting a manifesto, to which some may attach their signature and others not,
but we are trying to lay down a legal regime, which by that very token must work in the
present-day world, which means that it must be accepted by all concerned.
Oxman, supra note 10, at 8-9 (emphasis in original).
21. Rusk Center Newsletter, Oct. 1983, at 1. "The preparatory Commission of the Law of
the Sea opened deliberations in Jamaica in August. Almost every country in the world except the
.U.S. was present." Id.
22. Id.
The U.S. wants the treaty's provisions on a 200 mile exclusive economic zone, a 12 mile
territorial limit, rights of passage for its civilian and military ships through narrow straits,
pollution control and the system of international courts to arbitrate disputes at sea. The
administration objects, however, to Article 11 which governs access to mineral rich nodules
in the ocean floor.

Id.
The Reagan administration
[A]nnounced that practically all the other provisions, especially those relating to international navigation and the rights and duties of coastal states, have by now become customary international law and as such binding on all states, whether parties to the Convention
or not. In particular, in April 1983, President Reagan proclaimed a 200-mile wide exclusive economic zone, in terms consistent with the new Convention, and promised that the
United States, subject to reciprocality, will respect similar zones established by other
states.
L. SOHN & K. GUSTAFSON, supra note 16, at XIX-XX.
Fundamental international law dictates that a unilateral declaration by one state as to the
law that is binding on other sovereign states is of no legal impact. It may be the international law
operative in the United States, but to make it binding on other nation-states, it must be recognized by the international community. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
art. 38(l). When all aspects of a specific body of international law have been made the subject of
a fully integrated convention, like that of the Law of the Sea, the unilateral declaration by 'a
single nation-state lacks not only the legal protections of a treaty, but also is probably the best
example of a situation where the respect for that declaration is completely at the discretion of
other nation states, unless and until one or more qualified international forums declare the specific
legal provision in question to have been international law, de lege lata, prior to the convention.
North Sea Continental Shelf (Fed. Rep. of Ger. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 4. In sum, the international
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clude that, in this particular instance, the private monetary gain of the
few superceded the military requisites of the nation. And, this is the
choice of an administration that from the outset has, with the greatest
possible resolution, insisted on the primary importance of our national
security.

III.

"STAR WARS"

On March 23, 1983, in a nationwide television address, President
Reagan proposed the militarization of outer space 23-- even though such
a move had been recently denied by the deputy general counsel of the
president's own arms control agency.24 Instantly dubbed "Star Wars"
by the media, this obvious reversal of policy was the apparent product
of "careful study" within the administration. 25 Citing the primary importance of our national security, President Reagan presented his plan
for the militarization of "man's last frontier" as a bold, imaginative,
incisive initiative, one that made intelligent use of our national technological preeminence.
The president's speech triggered an instant debate, both at home
and abroad. Most of the discussion centered on the wisdom of the proposal; few considered the important question of its legality. That legal
judgment appears certain, in spite of earlier statements by members of
the administration to the contrary: The "Star Wars" program would
clearly violate United States treaty commitments and, most probably,
general norms of international law as well.2 6

legal protections of the United States are very slim indeed, and all the unilateral declarations to
the contrary serve little if any legal purpose other than to declare the intention or policy of the
United States.
The debate concerning the Law of the Sea Treaty and the Reagan administration's stance
regarding it is continued in this symposium. Lay, An Analysis of the Deep Seabed Mining Provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 319 (1985).
23. N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1983, at Al, col. 6.
24. Wulf, Arms Control-Outer Space, 11 J. SPACE L. 67 (1983) (Mr. Wulf and other
administration spokespersons each make the standard disclaimer that the views expressed are their
own and not necessarily those of the Reagan administration).
25. "Presently, the United States has no desire to engage in a costly arms race in outer
space . . . . [But] [s]pace arms control policy is currently undergoing careful study within the
United States Government." Id. at 72 (emphasis added).
26. Thus, Mr. David Small, assistant legal advisor for UN affairs at the State Department,
made the following statement on April 23, 1982, one year before the president's speech:
From our perspective in the United States, there is currently no norm of international
law which prohibits military activities in, and military uses of, outer space. There is no
general prohibition on weapons in space, although there are specific limitations which pertain to weapons on the Moon and other celestial bodies, and to the general prohibitions on
placement of weapons of mass destruction in space. As a matter of fact, despite the common impression to the contrary, the operative provision in the 1967 treaty of limitation to
peaceful uses applies to the Moon and does not apply to space generally.
Accordingly, our efforts to meet this concern about militarization involve not the inter-
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IV.

GRENADA

On October 25, 1983, the island state of Grenada was invaded by
the military forces of the United States in direct violation of United
States legal obligations under articles 2(1)27 and 2(4)2' of the United

pretation of existing treaties or rules of law, but an undifferentiated opposition to military
activities.
1982 PROC. AM. Soc'y INT'L L. 289 (remarks by David Small).
However, two commentators have concluded that the Reagan "Star Wars" defense system
would be inconsistent with the Limitation of Anti-ballistic Missle Systems (ABM) Treaty, 23
U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503. A. SHERR, LEGAL ISSUES OF THE "STAR WARS" DEFENSE PROGRAM ix; Meredith, The Legality of a High-Technology Missle Defense System: The ABM and
Outer Space Treaties, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 418, 420-21 (1984).
A second treaty to which the U.S. is a party is the United Nations sponsored Outer Space
Treaty, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 18 U.N.T.S. 2410. (Caveat: This multinational convention should not
be confused with the United States-Soviet Union bilateral Agreement for the Cooperation, Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes, 28 U.S.T. 7624, T.I.A.S. No. 8732, which
lapsed on May 24, 1982, and thus is no longer in effect.) Even Mr. Wuif, a member of the
Reagan administration, has succinctly described this "Constitution of Outer Space" as "promoting international cooperation and understanding" and "establish[ing] a general norm of peaceful
uses of outer space." Wulf, supra note 24, at 69.
Article IV of the agreement, which prohibits the placement of weapons of mass destruction or
nuclear weapons in outer space, has been the subject of some debate. Ms. Meredith concludes that
the president's program would not violate the treaty. Meredith, supra, at 423. However, at least
one scholar reads article IV in a contrary manner: "The conclusion is inescapable that, if the word
.peaceful' in Article IV(2) is to have any meaning at all, it must bear its plain meaning
of 'nonmilitary' and can certainly not mean 'non-aggressive.' Cheng, The Legal Status of Outer Space
and Relevant Issues: Delimitationof Outer Space and Definition of Peaceful Use, II J. SPACE L.
89, 103-04 (1983). It is submitted that the intricate analysis of Mr. Cheng is the correct one in
that it affords all parts of the relevant treaty provisions their fullest consistent meaning.
There appears to be little debate over either the substance or international legal status of
article III of the Outer Space Treaty. As Mr. Wulf pointed out, the entire treaty "establishes a
general norm of peaceful uses of outer space." Wulf supra note 24, at 69. The substance of article
Ill has also become the focus of numerous publicists. J. FAWCETr, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
USES OF OUTER SPACE (1968); M. LACHs, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE: AN EXPERIENCE IN CONTEMPORARY LAW MAKING (1972); S. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD, THE LAW RELATING TO ACTIVITIES OF MAN IN SPACE (1970). Given this experience, there appears to be little doubt that
the
general provisions of article IIl have become opinio juris sive necessitatis,and as such constitute
customary principles of international law-the second source of international law listed in article
38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. See North Sea Continental Shelf (Fed.
Rep. of Ger. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 4, 37; A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 47-50 (1970).
One, of course, may claim that the president's "Star Wars" initiative is designed to be a
defensive program and thus, in article III terms, is "in the interest of maintaining international
peace and security." Without debating the validity of that contention, the program must also (the
article III conjunction is "and") result in "promoting international cooperation and understanding." Given President Reagan's proposals, one would have great difficulty in arguing that his
"Star Wars" program satisfies that requirement. Indeed, it has had the opposite result. One must
conclude, therefore, that despite administration claims to the contrary, the "Star Wars" program
violates both treaty and custom, the two principal sources of international law, as that law is
presently formulated.
27. "The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. I.
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Nations Charter; 9 articles 130 and 91' of the Inter-American Treaty of
Recriprocal Assistance (known as the Rio Treaty); and articles 15,32
17,33 and 2034 of the Charter of the Organization of American States.
More importantly, since these treaty provisions express the most inviolable principle of contemporary international law-that of territorial
integrity-the military action represented the gravest of all possible violations of international law. Legal support is not heightened by the
alleged rescue pretext for the invasion, a5 since that excuse was swiftly
belied by the ensuing military developments on the island. In international legal terms, this invasion and complete occupation was no different from those of the axis powers prior to and during World War II, or
the much more recent Soviet invasion of Afganistan that has been so
thoroughly castigated by the United States along with freedom-loving
people everywhere.
On November 2, 1983, eight days after the invasion, the United

28. "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Id. art. 2, para. 4.
29. See generally Wright, The Legality of Intervention under the United Nations Charter,
1957 PROC. AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. 79.
30. "The High Contracting Parties formally condemn war and undertake in their international relations not to resort to the threat or the use of force in any manner inconsistent with the
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations or of this Treaty." Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance art. 1, 62 Stat. 1681, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77, done at Rio de
Janeiro, Sept. 2, 1947.
31. Id. art. 9 (characterizing aggression as unprovoked armed attack or invasion of an
American state).
32. No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any
reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted
threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural
elements.
Charter of the Organization of American States art. 15, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119
U.N.T.S. 3, done at Bogota, Apr. 30, 1948.
33. The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of
military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial aquisitions or special advantages obtained
either by force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized.
Id. art. 17.
34. "All international disputes that may arise between American States shall be submitted
to the peaceful procedures set forth in this Charter, before being referred to the Security Council
of the United Nations." Id. art 20.
35. The pretext was the rescue of American citizens (mostly medical students) on the island. On the question of whether the precharter doctrine of humanitarian intervention survives the
impact of section 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, see Brownlie, HumanitarianIntervention,
in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 217 (J. Moore ed. 1974); Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Jan Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in id. at
229. See generally HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS (R. Lillich ed.
1973).
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Nations General Assembly condemned the action.3 6 Declaring that the
invasion was a "violation of international law," the world body acted
before the United States or its eastern Carribean supporters could present their position. Moreover, the margin of the vote was greater than

the assembly's earlier condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghani-

stan.3 7 Under the law of the charter, and thus international law,38 the
Organization of American States (O.A.S.) was the only collective
group of nation-states other than the United Nations that could have
mounted the invasion of Grenada."9 Interestingly, there was no similar

condemnation or comparable declaration by the O.A.S., which took no

action at all, even though both the O.A.S. Charter, and the Rio Treaty
called for a response."
The unofficial reaction of the United States international law community was both extensive and immediate. For example, in less than a
year the preeminent American Journal of InternationalLaw devoted
an entire section consisting of five separate titles to "The United States
Action in Grenada."' 1 Of the twelve contributors, nine roundly condemned the invasion in a relatively short piece entitled "International
Lawlessness in Grenada." 142 One extensive study strongly criticized the
action. 3 Another piece; evaluating the performance of the international

36. G.A. Res. 38 (1983).
37. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1983, at A21, col. 1.
38. As a multilateral treaty, constitutional in character and possessing near universal membership, the charter is clearly the best possible source of international law.
39. U.N. CHARTER art. 52, para. I (allowing for regional arrangements to deal with regional peace and security).
40. OAS CHARTER, supra note 32, art. 28; Rio Treaty, supra note 30, art. 3, para. 1.
41. 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 131 (1984).
42. Lawlessness, supra note 1, at 172.
U.S. military action in egregious violation of international law sends a strong message
to the entire international community that in the opinion of the U.S. Government the traditional rules restricting the use of force no longer apply in settling the myriad of contemporary international disputes. When even the United States flouts international law, the only
consequence can be an increasing degree of international violence, chaos and anarchy. U.S.
military forces are not up to the task of policing the entire globe. And as the War Power
Act proves, the American people would not permit them to do so anyway, despite the
inclinations of the Reagan administration to the contrary.
Id. at 174.
43. Joyner, Reflections on the Lawfulness of the Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 131 (1984).
Professor Joyner concludes:
One may infer from the Grenada experience that the United States-a traditional
champion and purveyor of international law and order against tyrannical regimes-has
rethought its diplomatic options and political capabilities in the hemisphere, and concluded
that it can no longer afford to play by the rules of the game. If so, it would be unfortunate
indeed .... Unilateral or even group-sanctioned military intervention contributes little to
enhancing the viability of international law in a world dominated by sovereign nationstates. In fact, it may radically detract from it.
Id. at 144.
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legal community in informing the public, weighed in against the invasion. 4 Only one of the dozen commentators attempted to support the
legality of the military action.4" Based upon this single, uniquely qualified collection of responses, both qualitative and quantitative modes of
measurement result in a compelling verdict that appears to be very
clear indeed.
V.

NICARAGUA AND THE WORLD COURT

On the morning of November 3, 1979, the U.S. embassy in Tehran, Iran, was overrun by a group of several hundred well-armed
"demonstrators," supported in the streets by approximately three thousand of their jeering, taunting, screaming countrymen. Of the sixtythree American citizens initially captured there and elsewhere in Iran,
twenty-eight were specifically recognized by the Iranian government as
possessing diplomatic immunity, and twenty were specifically recog-

46
nized as members of the embassy staff. Thus began an ordeal of im-

prisonment, abusive treatment, and instances of psychological torture
that was to last fourteen months, and that was at all times fully supported by the "government" of Iran under its new theocratic dictator,
the Ayatollah Khomeini. While an angered, civilized world looked on
in a continued state of disbelief, friendly governments as well as private
individuals and groups sought all possible means to end the barbarity.
There was never any doubt that the "official" Iranian atrocities
were in clear violation of one of the oldest and most firmly established
principles of international law. 47 Indeed, the legal maxim legatos vio44. Vogts, International Law under Time Pressure: Grading the Grenada Take-Home Examination, id. at 169.
45. Moore, Grenada and the International Double Standard, id. at 145.
Factually the Grenada mission took place at the independent request of the most immediately affected nations of the Carribean region, acting pursuant to the applicable regional security treaty for Grenada; at the request of the Governor-General of Grenada; in a
setting of breakdown of government authority and widespread threats to civilians; and with
the support of 91 percent of the Grenada population. Legally, United States participation
in the Grenada mission, at the request of the OECS states, Barbados and Jamaica, and the
Governor-General of Grenada, amply rests on the combined basis of regional peacekeeping
under Article 52 of the United Nations Charter, humanitarian protection (both "protection
of nationals" and "humanitarian intervention") in conformity with Articles 2(4) and 51 of
the Charter and a request from lawful authority in Grenada. That participation is in full
accord with the United Nations, OAS and OECS Charters and United States national law.
Most importantly, by serving human rights, self-determination and international peace and
security, the mission serves the core purposes of these great Charters.
J. MOORE, LAW AND THE GRENADA MISSION 85 (1984).
46. These facts are stated as conclusions of fact in paragraphs 17 through 22 of the decision
of the International Court of Justice in United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
(USA v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3.
47. H. BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS 748-49 (2d ed. 1952); P. CORBETT, LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE RELATION OF STATES 189-208 (1951); L. HENKIN, supra note 8, at 490.
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lare contra jus gentium est (it is contrary to the law of nations to injure ambassadors) can be traced back three and a half centuries to
Lord Coke.4 Moreover, these criminal acts violated no less than five
international treaties or agreements binding on Iran 4 9-not to mention
the basic tenets of Islamic law that the captors and their "government"
often mouthed as justification for their acts. 50
The United States government swiftly embraced litigation in the
International Court of Justice as one of its first avenues of redress. 51
Aware of the utter bankruptcy of their position, the "government" of
Iran chose to completely ignore the legal action brought against them.
Although immediately notified of the court's action,52 Iran neither filed
any pleadings53 nor appeared at the hearings" 4-even though the court
clearly had jurisdiction to hear the case. 5 5 The results were fully predictable. On December 15, 1979, a mere sixteen days5 6 after the
United States requested relief, the court issued an order that "called
for the immediate restoration of the Embassy to the United States and
the release of the hostages. 57
On May 24, 1980, the court issued a judgment fully condemning
the leaders and government of Iran, one that unanimously declared
that they: (1) release the hostages; (2) provide them with transportation out of the country; (3) not subject any of them to any form of
judicial proceeding-including appearance as a witness; and (4) turn
over the U.S. embassy and consulate premises, property, archives and
documents to the "protecting Power," a foreign government acting in

48. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 808 (5th ed. 1979); T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF
THE COMMON LAW 280-81 (5th ed. 1956).
49. USA v. Iran, 1980 I.C.J. at 5 (the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961,
the Optional Protocol to that convention concerning compulsory settlement of disputes, the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations of 1963, the optional protocol to that convention concerning the
compulsory settlement of disputes, and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents of 1973).
50. Professor Bassiouni, who is proud of his Islamic heritage, lists no less than ten Iranian
violations. Bassiouni, Protectionof Diplomats under Islamic Law, 74 AM. J.INT'L L. 609, 632-33
(1980).
51. In terms of the temporal circumstances obtaining in diplomatic practice, the State Department lost little time in filing the claim. Its legal advisor personally handed the proper legal
application (complaint) instituting legal action to the registrar of court (which is located in The
Hague, the Netherlands) on November 29, 1979-a mere twenty-five days after the diplomatic
rape of the United States embassy in Tehran. USA v. Iran, 1980 I.C.J. at 4.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 8, 38.
54. Id. at 5, 38.

55. Id. at 23-24.
56. International judicial action is usually not known for its expedition. However, what
often had been decades of waiting for resolution has more recently become only years.
57. USA v. Iran, 1980 I.C.J. at 35 (emphasis added).
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our behalf.a
Thus, the only universal judicial tribunal in the world fully protected the interests of the United States, and in so doing, reasserted as
clearly as was possible the international rule of law. Subsequently, this
legal conclusion was consistently reiterated in contacts with Iran, its
representatives, its nationals, and its few supporters, by both the United
States (including family members of the hostages in direct dialogue
with Iranian officials) and foreign officials. From the date of that decision there was no denial, even by Iran, as to who was the international
outlaw. And, although all international society was served by the swift
and decisive action of the World Court, the United States was its particular, specific beneficiary."
One would have believed that this factual, diplomatic and legal
scenario would have engendered substantial respect for the World
Court, both as an institution, and as a fair and objective instrument of
international dispute resolution-particularly on the part of the United
States government. This has, sadly, not proven to be true. Even though
the hostages were being released at the same time that Ronald Reagan
took his oath of office on the steps of the Capitol, President Reagan
subsequently announced early last April that the United States would
not accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice over
any dispute "with any Central American state."" °
Although the rejection was, technically speaking, a permissible option,"1 the response by those committed to the international rule of law

58. Id. at- 44-46. Judges Marozon and Tarazi dissented from the opinion of the fourteen
remaining judges with respect to various other condemnations of Iran.
59. For a discussion of another aspect of the court's opinion, see Stein, Contempt, Crisis
and the Court: The World Court and the Hostage Rescue Attempt, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 499
(1982).
60. N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1984, at Al, col. 2.
61. Article 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, usually referred to as
the "optional clause," permits nation-states to submit in advance to the power or "compulsory
jurisdiction" of the court for the resolution of all future disputes involving four areas that cumulatively cover most, if not virtually all, possible forms of international conflict. As of 1982, approximately forty nations have determined it to be in their national interest to take advantage of this
opportunity without contradictory reservations. 36 I.C.J.Y.B. 59-93 (1982).
In its declaration of August, 1946, the United States limited its adherence to the optional
clause to "disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
the United States of America as determined by the United States of America." Declaration of
August 14, 1946, 61 Stat. 1218 (1947). Known as the "Connally amendment" after the United
States senator who championed its inclusion, this limitation permits an automatic veto power by
the United States. In terms of commitment to the international rule of law, the amendment results
in our having given very little more than an empty shell-sheer window dressing without substance-thereby subjecting United States diplomacy to the possible charge of hypocrisy. Moreover, a second concomitant reservation denies application of the optional clause in "disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (1) all parties to the treaty affected by the decision are also
parties to the case before the Court, or (2) the United States of America specially agrees to
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was both immediate and intense.6 2 Significantly, the president's statement of policy was released only days before the commencement of the
seventy-seventh annual convention of the prestigious American Society
of International Law, in Washington, D.C. Rather than await publication of individual or group reactions in their journal, as was the case
after the Grenada invasion, almost all members felt a more immediate
response was necessary. After much discussion, they passed the following resolution in the name of the society:
Although the American Society of International Law ordinarily
does not take positions on matters of policy, the Society has previously
departed from this practice to support the acceptance by the United
States of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. The Society was founded "to foster the study of international law and to promote
the establishment and maintenance of international relations on the basis
of law and justice." It now reaffirms that international adjudication, and
the application of international law, constitute appropriate procedures
for resolving justiciable international disputes. The Society therefore deplores, and strongly favors recision of, the recent action of the United
States Government in attempting to withdraw from the jurisdiction of
the International Court of Justice "disputes with any Central American
63
state."

Additional proof of the importance the members of the society attributed to their action can be seen by the fact that this appears to
have been only the second time that the society has issued a resolution
regarding United States foreign policy in the entire seventy-seven years
of its existence. Ironically, the first instance was a request, almost three
decades earlier, that the United States join with other nations in submitting to the "compulsory jurisdiction ' 6 4 of the then recently reconsti65
tuted World Court.

jurisdiction." Id.
Given the rule of reciprocity endemic to international law, these two reservations can be used
by a potential adversary against our desire to bring them before the court. They constitute a
double-edged sword, granting ongoing discretion over World Court jurisdiction not only to the
United States, but also to nations with whom we may have future disputes. We have, in effect,
given those forty nations that do not have similar reservations to article 36(2) the weapon necessary to frustrate our desires at peaceful resolution of future disputes.
For a discussion of the Connally amendment, see Henkin, The Connally Reservation Revisited and, Hopefully, Contained,65 AM. J. INT'L L. 374 (1971). For the admission by the United
States that the reservation is reciprocal in impact, see L. HENKIN, supra note 8, at 869. See also
Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15.
62. Richard Gardner, former United States ambassador to Italy, and a professor at Columbia University, stated that: "I'm not sure there is any other case where a defendant country has
pre-empted jurisdiction literally on the eve of the case." TIME, Apr. 23, 1984, at 18.
63. Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Newsletter, May-June 1984, at 1.
64. See supra note 61.
65. Telephone interview with Ellen Riedell, Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law (Sept. 27, 1984).
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President Reagan's statement was triggered by a lawsuit about to
be filed in the World Court against the United States by Nicaragua.
The State Department quickly labeled the president's declaration as
"merely a tactical litigation move." 66 However characterized, it permitted Nicaragua's Foreign Minister to point out: "When Iran refused to
participate, the U.S. took the position that the court should go right
ahead. When we take this step, it is regarded as improper and propaganda. '6 7 Moreover, although the State Department insisted that deny6' 8
ing judicial jurisdiction was "not a sign of disrespect for the Court,
our United Nations Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick, sang a somewhat
different tune. Interviewed on television news shows, she took the position that "[t]he court, quite frankly, is not what its name suggests, an
international court of justice . . . . It's a semilegal, semijuridical, semipolitical body, which nations sometimes accept and sometimes don't."6 9
The unfortunate nature of this hastily determined public posture
on the part of the United States became starkly evident seven months
later. On November 26, 1984, the World Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear Nicaragua's claim that it was the victim of United
States aggression. Specifically, the court first voted fifteen to one
against the United States on the matter of jurisdiction, and then unanimously rejected State Department contentions that the court should
not proceed with the case even if jurisdiction existed.7 0 The lone dissenter on the first issue, the United States representative on the court,
obviously felt so strongly about the international rule of law that he
voted against his own country on the second issue-a most unusual occurrence in the more than half-century history of that tribunal.7
Since the court is by its organic law required to assure representa-

66. TIME, Apr. 23, 1984, at 18.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1984, at Al, col. 6. The court also kept in place a preliminary
restraining order issued against the U.S. in order to halt any blockade or mining attempts against
Nicaragua, as well as any other military or paramilitary activities. Id.
71. Id.
The one dissenting voice came from Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, the American member of the Court, who said that "Nicaragua manifestly is without standing to maintain suit
before this court." But the judge added he did not find the United States' contentions
about the case's inadmissibility convincing. He said that since the Court had established
that it has jurisdiction, there was no other reason the Court should not go to trial with the
case.
While Judge Schwebel's opinion indicated that he did not feel the Court should decide
the case because it lacked jurisdiction, he in effect said that since he was bound by the
decision of the majority on the jurisdictional issue, he was forced to consider the other
objections raised by the United States and could not agree with them.
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tion of "the principal legal systems of the world, ' 72 not only did judges
from the communist and third-world countries vote against the United
States, but also those from our most firm and constant allies: Britain,
France, Italy, Japan, and West Germany. 73 Of course, one could assume a cavalier attitude toward the World Court, similar to that of
Ambassador Kirkpatrick, 7 and conclude that its judges display a general nationalistic bias, and that their prejudicial votes are not limited to
situations in which their nation is involved in the case before the court.
To assume that the judges generally reflect "the political views of their
home countries," 75 however, is to also admit that, given the nature of
the vote in Nicaragua v. United States, United States policy in this
instance appears to be more isolated than during the darkest days of
the Vietnam conflict. Once again, the hazardous combination of coldwar tunnel vision and unsophisticated over-confidence 7 has placed the
United States "between a rock and a hard place."
Although the Reagan administration's immediate reaction to the
court's decision was one of uncertainty, 77 all doubts were removed on
January 18, 1985, when the State Department announced that the
United States would boycott all future proceedings in the case. 78 There
also appears to be little doubt about the eventual ruling of the World
Court: Nicaragua intends to proceed, with or without our participation, 79 in the pending substantive proceeding in The Hague (where the
court sits). In the end, the United States will almost certainly be
branded an aggressor nation.8 0 Thus, the Reagan administration's disaffection for the international rule of law has placed it in the unenviable position of imitating the Khomeini government in the hostages
case while at the same time claiming "that the United States has no

72. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 9.
73. N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1984, at A12, col. 5.
74. See supra text accompanying note 69.
75. N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1984, at A12, col. 5.
76. Shortly before the World Court's decision on November 26, State Department attorneys
had expressed the opinion that "they had an 'open and shut' legal case on jurisdiction"-the first
United States argument. Id.
77. Id.
78. Wash. Post, Jan. 19, 1985, at AI, col. 4.
79. Journal Herald (Dayton), Jan. 19, 1985, at 6, col. 1.
80. "Officials following the case said the 15-to- I decision seemed to portend that the Court
might eventually uphold Nicaragua's contention that the United States violated international law
by supporting military attacks against Nicaragua and order an end to such support." N.Y. Times,
Nov. 27, 1984, at A12, col. 5. (emphasis added). Leaving out consideration of the Court's vote
entirely, some officials of each of the contesting nations believe that condemnation of the- United
States will be the ultimate result of the litigation. Id. Indeed, administration officials had admitted
that "sooner or later" they were "likely to face what one called a 'very tough decision'-either
defy an order by the World Court and face international opprobrium as a lawless nation, or abandon its policy in Nicaragua." Id., at Al, col. 5.
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intention of ending its support of the World Court.""1
There are many important ramifications of this boycott policy. For
example, as pointed out by one editorialist, "[t]o have tried, even
vainly, to justify the violence against Nicaragua before the Court
would have shown a decent respect for the opinions of mankind. 8 2
When we wished to become a new nation, our Declaration of Independence proclaimed our "decent respect to the opinions of mankind," as
well as our confidence that international public opinion would agree
that "a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people" once we "let
Facts be submitted to a candid world." 3 Throughout out history we
have never questioned the sincerity of those expressions; rather, we
have built our nation upon them. With this boycott of the World Court,
the continuation of that compelling and profound commitment to truth
is, at least, open to challenge.
A second significant consequence of the administration boycott relates to the general subject of the peaceful settlement of international
disputes in our nuclear age. One is compelled to inquire if there exists
such a surfeit of peaceful processes for the resolution of international
disputes that we can afford to conclude that the International Court of

81. Wash. Post, Jan. i9, 1985, at Al, col. 4. In spite of the earlier U.S. victory against Iran
in the World Court, and the near-unanimous November vote in the instant case, the State Department boycott announcement argued, "[wle have seen how international organizations have become more and more politicized against the interests of the Western democracies." NEWSWEEK,
Jan. 28, 1985, at 45, col. 3.
82. N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1985, at E32, col. 2. The authors also pointed out,"[t]o have
submitted to the Court's judgment, even with the possibility of later ignoring it, would have dramatized a yearning for a superior order in which peoples surrender their 'sovereign' right to murder
other peoples to the kinds of institutions they readily accept inside their frontiers." Id.
The editors of the'New York Times also argued that the U.S. should appear and present its
case before the court.
If America failed to appear, as Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran did when charged with
seizing our hostages, the Court would have to give Nicaragua an unchallenged forum to
paint the United States as aggressor and to claim huge damages. Our case against Nicaragua's meddling in El Salvador, or elsewhere, would never even be heard.
More serious still, contempt for the court would reinforce the disturbing tendency,
especially in Western Europe, to judge the United States as cynically as the Soviet Union.
We treat Nicaragua the way the Kremlin treats Poland, people say, justifying a dangerous
drift toward neutralism.
And a boycott would damage the World Court itself. Frail and underused, it is none-'
theless a moral force, useful to American diplomacy and instructive to other nations. As
New York's Senator Moynihan lamented last spring, when he pleaded for respecting the
Court:
"We no longer seem to grasp that the law is on our side. We are, when we have our
wits about us, a law-abiding nation. It is in our interests that others should be. If, for
example, the Soviets are not, then that is their problem. If, because the Soviets are not, we
cease to be, then that is their victory."
Don't Duck Our Day in Court, id., at A26, col. 1.
83. Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776).
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Justice is virtually expendable. Moreover, before arriving at that conclusion, one must not only consider the qualifications and past contributions of the court,84 but the nature and ramifications of the alternative
means of resolution that those who reject the court's peaceful, legal
solution have necessarily embraced. Should it be the military option,
one can only comment with sadness that our policy makers have failed
to learn the lesson from our recent misadventure in Vietnam-that
having the biggest stick on the block does not guarantee its successful
5
8

use.

Given the rudimentary nature of the enforcement measures available in international law, there exists a strong temptation to cite expediency as a justification for its violation. This continues to be true, for
example, with respect to the use of aggression "in the cause of democracy" (as in Grenada). 6 Nor is it difficult to allege the power of one's
adversary as an expedient justification for the militarization of outer
space."7 Indeed, one could even advance the proposition that, given
United States commitment to private enterprise,81 we need not concern
ourselves with the explosive "North-South" problem-the widening
gap between the rich nations and the poor nations. Thus blinded in the
cause of expediency, we can reject the Law of the Sea Convention on
the basis of sheer power. 89 In its stead, we can sponsor a second "minitreaty" that would permit independent exploitation of suboceanic resources.9 Unfortunately, the spurious nature of the last suggestion can

84. S. ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT-WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS 166 (1973) (court
has "remarkable sense of appreciation of the changing currents of internationalist thought"). Ambassador Rosenne also concludes that the super powers like the United States are increasingly
inclined to take refuge behind the World Court when attacked by small states concerning economic relations. Id. at 166-67.
85. The debate concerning the United States' attempted withdrawal from the jurisdiction of
the World Court is continued in this symposium. Friedlander, Mr. Casey's "'Covert" War: The
United States, Nicaragua, and International Law, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 265 (1985); Hassan, A
Legal Analysis of the United States' Attempted Withdrawal from the Jurisdiction of the World
Court in the Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua, 10 U. DAYTON L. REv. 295 (1985).
86. In this regard, compare Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 642, 645 (1984) with Schachter, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, id., 645, 649-50.
87. See Vogt, 1982 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. at 292-93.
88. Kilpatrick, U.S. Wise to Reject "Law of the Sea," Atlanta Constitution, May 5, 1982.
89. Thus, our present ambassador to the conference, James Malone, said
A change in the leadership of the American delegation was essential, in order to ensure
that other countries clearly understood our seriousness of purpose with respect to the review. That action was necessary in order to send the signal to other delegations that the
U.S. could not be induced to return immediately, and thus prematurely, to the bargaining
table by offers of minor technical changes to the draft convention.
Oxman, supra, note 10, at 3.
90. For an evaluation of this possibility, see D'Amato, An Alternative to the Law of the Sea
Convention, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 281 (1983).
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be seen in the reality that both legal regimes will presume to regulate
the same seas and oceans. One is reminded of the legal maxim that
when the laws of governments fail, society must fall back on natural
law. 9 1 In this instance natural law will favor neither the ideology of the
Reagan administration nor the property interest of certain United
States entrepreneurs, but the concept of the "common heritage of mankind," embraced by the Law of the Sea Convention.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Spawned from the crucible of the Enlightenment, the United
States was created to symbolize five great principles or concepts: liberty, equality, democracy, justice, and human rights 9 2-all promoted
by legal institutions and, thus, at bottom, protected by the "rule of
law." The truly great American presidents have been those who, sensitive to those historical facts, have worked not only to preserve and foster these principles or concepts at home, but, by our example and
through our ever-increasing influence, promote them as the legal standards that would protect the entire world under the international rule
of law. Our success is in a large part measured by the fact that these
very same principles or concepts constitute the raison de etre of not
only the United Nations, but of all of the world's regional
organizations.93
Periodic failures and shortcomings in realizing these goals did not
deter their progressive development within our own land; 94 nor did similar shortcomings on the international stage9 5 permanently illegitimize
our long-range objectives or symbolic stature abroad. Rather, these
principled actions appear to reinforce this stature. Thus, objective, wellintentioned foreigners remember our insistence on self-determination at
Versaille; our insistence upon the League of Nations, the Four Freedoms, and the United Nations; our leadership (led by Eleanor
Roosevelt) in the promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights; our initiation and founding of the Marshall Plan, permitting
western democracy to survive; and our democratic restructuring of Japan and West Germany. These contributions to democracy, human
rights, and the international rule of law, express our basic national
principles and concepts. That is why they continue to represent "our

91. Legibus sumptis desinentibus, lege natural etendum est. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
809 (5th ed. 1979).
92. Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776).
93. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. I.
94. Compare, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) with Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
95. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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finest hours" in the history of the contemporary world.
Given the policies of the present administration, one is sadly
drawn to the compelling question: Is it too late for Ronald Reagan to
advance these principles and precepts through the international rule of
law, and, by so doing, join the pantheon of truly great American
presidents?
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